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Abstract 
Producers and marketing agents use a variety of formal and informal contractual 
arrangements in the fruit and vegetable subsector in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the m'Jr:! 
complicated forms of contracts exist for production that is exported to Europe. This paper 
summarizes the contract arrangements found in Ghana, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda. 
Low levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, access to fmancial services and information tend to 
be related with spot market mechanisms. Higher levels of each tend to lead to the use of 
completely vertically integrated arrangements. Other factors such as access to land markets are 
important in some cases in influencing the organization of production and marketing. 
Contract Arrangements in the Fruit And Vegetable Subsector 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Geetha N agarajan and Richard L. Meyer1 
Producers and marketing agents use a variety of formal and informal contract arrangements 
in the production and marketing of fresh fruits and vegetables in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Spot 
market transactions predominate in domestic trade. More complicated forms of contract 
arrangements exist for production destined for export to Europe. These include various types of 
vertical integration and other coordination methods designed to address the difficulties of 
penetrating the increasingly competitive foreign markets. Access to fmance is also a consideration 
and often producers and exporters finance the trade by selling commodities on consignment. 
Jaffee (1992) explained contract mechanisms ranging from spot market transactions to 
vertical integration based on various combinations of specialization of assets required for the trade 
(asset specificity) and the magnitude of uncertainty involved in trading the commodity. An 
important limitation of his framework when employed in developing countries is that it does not 
internalize the imperfections that often exist in fmancial markets. There is an increasing need to 
study the relationships between market coordination mechanisms and fmancial markets (Hart, 
1988). Nagarajan and Meyer (1994) proposed a modified framework that recognizes the flow of 
commodities accompanied by a payment system that often involves deferred or advance payments. 
The modified framework extends the explanation of contract arrangements to include asset 
specificity and uncertainty as well as access to information and fmance. 
This paper examines the contractual arrangements observed in the fruit and vegetable 
subsector in Ghana, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda using the modified framework. These 
countries were included in the study because the US agency for International Development 
(USAID) was attempting to assess them to expand their nontraditional exports. Information 
gathered based on field research conducted in the four study countries during 1993-94 is used in 
the analysis. Interviews were also conducted with producers, marketing agents, exporters and 
importers in London, Paris and Amsterdam. The commodities emphasized were pineapples and 
Asian vegetables. The next section outlines the modified framework and is followed by a 
description of the various participants in the subsector. The description and explanation for the 
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marketing and financial contract arrangements that facilitate the flow of commodities are then 
discussed. The implications for governments and donors conclude the paper. 
I. Modified Framework 
An important contribution of Jaffee (1992), following the transaction costs literature, was 
to develop a framework to study the contract arrangements used in the vegetable subsector in 
Kenya. He postulated that asset specificity and uncertainty in production and marketing of the 
product significantly affect the contract arrangements found in a sub sector. He showed that the 
greater the degree of asset specificity and uncertainty, the greater will be the tendency for firms 
to vertically integrate their operations. The opposite was postulated for the existence of spot 
markets. Different combinations of asset specificity and uncertainty would lead to diverse ty:;?es 
of short and long-term interlinked contracts between producers, marketing agents and/or 
exporters. 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that access to fmancial markets is also observed to 
shape the arrangements found in a subsector ranging from spot markets to complete vertical 
integration of firms. In The Gambia, better access to fmance facilitated the complete vertical 
integration of the fertilizer subsector (Nagarajan and Meyer, 1995). Studies also show that private 
commodity markets in Africa are generally competitive at the wholesale and retail levels despite 
weaknesses in transport, information, infrastructure, formal fmancial markets and law 
enforcement. But informal contract arrangements have been developed to mitigate fmancial and 
informational problems (Jaffee, 1992; Baydas and Meyer, 1993). Indeed, complex contractual 
arrangements observed in the African fresh fruit and vegetable subsector have enabled firms to 
compensate for deficiencies in the enabling environment by internalizing flows of information, 
fmance and physical commodities to lower risks and economize on transaction costs (Jaffee, 
1995). Economies of scale in processing/marketing facilities, strong technical, fmancial and 
managerial barriers to entry, market information, and the oligopolistic structure of world markets 
are observed to result in higher levels of market concentration with vertically integrated firms 
(Jaffee, 1992). The exporters of fresh tomatoes in Morocco that completely vertically integrated 
their operations due to their access to information and finance sold predictable quantities of 
tomatoes at 50 percent above the market price (Wilcock, et al., 1990). 
These findings demonstrate that the imperfections of financial markets and the limited 
access to information that often exist in developing countries need to be incorporated into 
explanations about contract arrangements. Therefore, the modified framework extends Jaffee's 
framework by including fmancial market agents as participants in the subsector in addition to the 
producers and marketing agents of inputs and products. The modified framework also recognizes 
that informational flows lead to new forms of linkages and coordination among agents/frrms to 
minimize transaction costs. Thus, the modified framework explains contracts based on the four 
factors of asset specificity uncertainty, and access to fmance and information. 
3 
Several types of contract arrangements ranging from spot markets to vertically integrated 
operations are used to facilitate the smooth flow of commodities in a subsector. In spot markets, 
the participants are multiple independent firms that specialize in one or more stages of commodity 
flows and the transactions are usually consummated through immediate cash payments. In 
complete vertical integration, all assets at all stages from production to marketing are owned by 
a single firm that produces all the commodities marketed by it. In quasi-vertical integration (also 
called partial vertical integration), the products marketed by the focal firm are produced by both 
the firm and its contracted partners. Between spot markets and complete vertical integration lie 
several types of contractual arrangements including market specification, production management 
and resource providing contracts. Market specification contracts are formal but open contracts 
that are closer to spot markets in which a marketing firm promises a market outlet to its 
contracting partners without specifying the quantity to be purchased or the price. The firm also 
commits none of its resources to the production of the commodities. The marketing frrm assumes 
the marketing risk and management, but transfers them to the producers at the production stage; 
assets are individually owned by the contracted producers. In production management contracts, 
the marketing firm has increased control over the production and management of contracted 
producers since it is concerned about the quality of the product. Resource providing contracts are 
closer to quasi vertical integration in which marketing frrms provide market outlets and inputs for 
the production processes of their producer clients. The marketing frrms have almost complete 
control over production decisions although the assets used in production are owned and operated 
by the producers. Contract farming arrangements generally use resource providing, production 
management and market specification contracts to establish linkages between producers and 
marketing agents and/ or exporters. 
The modified framework is utilized in table 1 to produce a matrix of several types of 
contract arrangements that may arise due to asset specificity, uncertainty and access to fmance and 
information. It can be postulated that a combination of low levels of asset specificity, uncertair~ty, 
access to fmancial services and information tend to be related with open spot market mechanisms. 
On the other hand, high levels of idiosyncratic investments and uncertainties in production and 
marketing, and good access to fmance and information would lead to the use of completely 
vertically integrated arrangements. Several types of contractual arrangements such as quasi 
vertical integration, resource providing, production management and market specification 
contracts will emerge between the spot and completely integrated markets to internalize the 
varying levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, access to fmance and information so that 
transaction costs are minimized. 
In the following sections, the participants in the subsector are first described and then the 
marketing and financial contract arrangements are discussed using the modified framework 
outlined above. 
II. The Participants in the Fruit and Vegetable Subsector 
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(a) Producers: The majority of the produce sold in the domestic markets is grown by 
numerous small producers and a few large farms. Several small producers in peri-urban areas 
also function as outgrowers to large producers or exporters. The small producers usually serve 
the domestic markets through marketing agents, and indirectly the overseas markets through their 
contracted exporters. The large producers, however, concentrate on the overseas markets, and 
sell their export surplus/rejects in the intra- and inter-regional markets through marketing agents. 
(b) Consumers: The intra- and inter-regional markets are the primary consumers of large 
volumes of low value horticultural produce grown in the study countries. A limited quantity is 
also consumed by domestic hotels and restaurants that cater to the local residents and tourists. 
The EU markets have become major overseas consumers in recent years through increased exports 
of: (i) Asian vegetables to ethnic markets, especially in the UK, (ii) high value products such as 
organic produce and asparagus to supermarkets, and (iii) roses to auction markets in Holland. 
The European demand for high quality products and reliable supplies have influenced the several 
contractual arrangements observed in the study countries. 
(c) Marketing agents: Several wholesalers, retailers and commission agents function as 
market intermediaries to facilitate the smooth flow of commodities from producers to final 
consumers in inter- and intra-regional markets. While the marketing agents, especially 
wholesalers, frequently produce the products traded by them, the retailers and commission agents 
generally perform only marketing functions. These agents generally operate within established 
markets. 
(d) Exporters: There are several exporters who actively trade with neighboring African 
countries but only a few export to overseas markets. The majority of the exporters tend to 
produce the products traded by them. However some producer-exporters also buy from contracted 
outgrowers and independent growers to increase their volume of exports. There also exist a few 
pure exporters who only purchase and export the products produced by contracted outgrowers and 
independent growers (see table 2, section II). 
(e) Agents providing support services: This subsector also requires efficient functioning 
of markets requires efficient support services provided by governments, research and extension 
agents, financial markets, and agents involved in providing transportation, packaging facilities and 
market information. A constraint in these four study countries is that their governments currently 
play an insignificant role in providing the infrastructure required for the effective marketing of 
horticultural produce. Government research and extension support for production and marketing 
of horticultural produce is also negligible. Internal transportation facilities are poor. Although 
the majority of produce exported to the EU is air freighted, the airport facilities are poorly 
maintained and the lack of cold storage facilities at airports increases quality deterioration due to 
tarmac spoilage. In addition, air freight costs are high so several low value products such as 
Asian vegetables produces fairly low profit margins for the exporters. In addition, the 
airfreighters have a small capacity and are not consistent in their schedules. Furthermore, local 
facilities do not exist to produce quality packaging materials designed for exports so need to be 
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imported from neighboring countries. For example, the packaging materials used in Uganda, The 
Gambia and Swaziland are imported from Kenya, ~enegal and South Africa, respectively. 
The several agents described above coordinate their marketing and financing activities 
through diverse types of contract arrangements as summarized in the next section. 
III. Contract Arrangements for Marketing Fruits and Vegetables 
The contract arrangements reported by the participants and presented in table 2, section 
III range from complete vertical integration to spot markets. The majority of the large 
commercial farms in Ghana and The Gambia performed several activities ranging from production 
to exporting rather than specializing in a single activity. In general, while some were completely 
vertically integrated, others were quasi vertically integrated. Several contract arrangements 
including resource providing, production management and market specification contracts were also 
used to procure commodities from outgrowers and independent growers. Diversity, however, 
exists even among participants producing/trading in almost the same commodities. In short, there 
is neither uniformity nor a clear pattern in the marketing arrangements used by the several agents 
operating in this subsector. 
The marketing structure of the subsector in the study countries cannot be described by a 
single nomenclature. At the producer level, it is dualistic. On the one hand, there exist several 
small producers operating fragmented farms primarily servicing domestic spot markets and, to a 
lesser extent, the inter-regional markets through several marketing agents. Occasionally, some 
of these producers may also function as outgrowers to large producer-exporters/exporters. On 
the other hand, few large producers are engaged in exporting and have vertically integrated 
operations from production to exports. The level of integration may be of two types: (i) partial 
in the case of large producer-exporters who also buy from outgrowers to increase their volume 
of exports (for example, exporters of Asian vegetables in Ghana, The Gambia and Uganda), :m.d 
(ii) complete in the case of large producer-exporters who produce all the produce they export (for 
example, the rose producing farms in Uganda). These large producer-exporters primarily serve 
overseas markets and only sell rejects in the inter- and intra-regional markets. At the market 
agent level, several competitive wholesalers, commission agents and retailers service inter- and 
intra-regional markets. 
All transactions in the fruit and vegetable trade must be accompanied by a payment and 
financing system. The fmancial flows are summarized below. 
IV. Contract Arrangements for Financing Fruits and Vegetable Subsector 
Several fmancial sources ranging from formal banks to informal money lenders exist for 
financing the fruit and vegetable subsector. Despite the varied economic performance due to 
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adjustments in macroeconomic policies among the case study countries, the mechanisms observed 
to finance the subsector are similar. The diverse sources of finance observed in the four case 
study countries are summarized in table 3. The financial arrangements found in the subsector can 
be characterized as follows: 
(a) Self-fmance is predominant in most firms. Funds are usually accumulated through 
retained earnings. Pure producers selling to domestic markets and exporters often participate in 
informal group activities such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) to save and 
finance their businesses. Several of the large producer-exporters are, however, observed to be 
conglomerates involved in other businesses that cross-subsidize their horticultural 
production/export operations. 
(b) On the one hand, informal finance through supplier's credit is frequently observed at 
all levels with fmance flowing upward from producers to importers. On the other hand, as 
noticed in Uganda, a limited amount of buyer's credit is reported to be extended downward by 
exporters to their established outgrowers. Informal finance provided by friends and relatives and 
fellow traders is also commonly observed. 
(c) Some NGOs in The Gambia, Ghana and Uganda provide grants and loans in a few 
cases to pure producers to acquire and prepare land and purchase inputs. But these fmancial 
services for fruit and vegetable producers are designed largely to create income generation 
activities and to improve the nutritional level of the households rather than to boost horticultural 
production for export. 
(d) Joint ventures with foreign importers who provide capital and information to exporters 
are emerging to finance investments, working capital needs and marketing costs. Examples are 
found in Ghana and Uganda. 
(e) Venture capital funds are limited to large size investments for commercial farms active 
in flower production. An example here is Uganda rose exporters. 
(f) Off-shore banks provide services through the provision ofletters of credit (L!Cs). The 
large producer-exporters with established overseas networks and offshore banking accounts can 
obtain letters of credit from these off-shore banks to finance their shipments to Europe. 
(g) Formal fmance from domestic banks in terms of direct loans is negligible at all levels. 
The majority of banks are located in urban areas and have few branches in rural areas. The share 
of agricultural loans in the total loan portfolio of commercial banks in the countries is 
insignificant, and the interest rates charged are very high compared to inflation rates and those 
charged by off-shore banks. The large producer-exporters and pure exporters can obtain 
conventional overdraft facilities to service some part of their short-term expenses and marketing 
costs. Nonetheless, these overdraft facilities are available only for established exporters. 
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The financial arrangements found in the fruit and vegetable sub sector, in short, are rela-
tively straight forward and uncomplicated: self-finance and informal finance through contractual 
arrangements predominate. The largest and most well established enterprises have some access 
to local and offshore banks to fmance their production and exports to Europe. But, large 
producers and even medium sized operators, to a greater or lesser extent, act as creditors by 
selling their produce on consignment to their buyers in local and export markets. In effect, they 
offer supplier credit with terms from one to four weeks before receiving payment. Thus, the 
marketing and financial flows are highly intertwined. 
V. Marketing and Financial Contract Arrangements: An Explanation 
Several factors influence the observed intertwining of marketing and financial centrad 
arrangements found in the subsector. These contractual arrangements can be explained through 
the modified framework outlined above. The predicted contract arrangements based on the 
modified framework and the observed contract arrangements in the study countries are presented 
in table 4. The analysis using selected crops shows the following: 
(a) Tomatoes and cabbages: The observed spot market arrangement is correctly 
predicted by the modified framework. 
(b) Asian vegetables: The modified framework predicts contractual arrangements such 
as resource providing contracts, production management contracts and market specification 
contracts. While the above arrangements are observed to a limited extent, quasi vertical 
integration is reported to be the predominant arrangement. However, the quasi vertically 
integrated firms that buy from outgrowers used market specification, production management and 
resource providing contracts to obtain the products. 
(c) Pineapples: This scenario is similar to the case of Asian vegetables. While 
contractual arrangements such as resource providing contracts, production management contracts 
and market specification contracts are predicted to reduce transaction costs, we observe mostly 
complete and quasi vertically integrated firms. Nonetheless, the quasi vertically integrated firms 
used market specification and production management contracts to obtain products from their 
outgrowers. 
The modified framework, based on asset specificity, uncertainty, and access to fmance and 
information, predicts outgrower or contract farming arrangements wherein marketing 
agents/exporters rely more on production through contract farmers and less on their own farm 
production. However, we observe several quasi vertically integrated firms that primarily produce 
all the products marketed/exported by them and buy from outgrowers using contractual 
arrangements to only fill in for deficits. The slight divergence between the observed and the 
predicted contract arrangements can be attributed to several reasons. 
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In general, the use of outgrowers depends on the type of the produce, level of 
infrastructure and support facilities available, and ability of the contractors to screen and momtor 
the outgrowers and effectively enforce contracts. The necessary conditions for contract farming 
include the technical characteristics of the commodities. Crops that are highly perishable, labor 
intensive, require specialized inputs and technology, involve long gestation periods, exhibit 
economies of scale only in marketing and not in production and require less monitoring to ensure 
quality are suitable for contract farming (Little et al., 1994; Minot, 1986). Sufficient conditions 
for contract farming include conducive macro and micro environments for production and contract 
enforcement. Land tenure systems that do not provide leases of sufficient duration or security to 
safeguard tenant investments are not conducive to contract farming. Price controls and market 
regulations should be minimum, and access to finance and information should be good for the 
contractors so they can pass it on to their outgrowers. Also, access to good transportation 
facilities and communication should exist. Support from producers organizations that can lobby 
for producers' interests and vouch for product quality is also essential. Furthermore, if contracts 
are hardly enforceable, transaction costs involved in suing a small holder are high. Indeed, 
contract enforcement mechanisms increase the danger of souring relations with small farmers and 
makes it difficult to practice contract farming (Glover, 1984, 1990). 
While the modified framework considers the necessary conditions and a few aspects of 
sufficient conditions, it assumes that the land and labor markets do not affect the contract 
arrangements. However, the unrestricted access to land in the Gambia and Ghana through long-
term leases, and the fact that the majority of crops that are currently produced for exports require 
close monitoring to maintain quality has restricted the use of contract farming in these countries 
in addition to other factors outlined by the modified framework. Therefore, there are clear 
indications of a move towards complete/quasi vertically integrated large farms active in the 
production and exporting of fruits and vegetables. The preponderance of quasi vertically 
integrated firms can be attributed to four factors: (i) the presence of some economies of scope in 
the joint management of several activities and less economies of scale in specialization in just one 
activity such as production, (ii) the high costs in monitoring outgrowers for certain crops, (iii) the 
high barriers of access to finance and information to all but large farms. Better access to finance 
and information tend to offer a comparative advantage over the competitors, and (iv) access to 
long-term land leases to produce the crops. In contrast, the restricted access in Uganda to land 
for foreigners who are generally the primary participants in commercial production and marketing 
of fruits and vegetables combined with other factors outlined in the modified framework prompted 
the use of contract farming in the subsector. The welfare implications of the various types of 
contract arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper. For details on welfare implications of 
contract farming, refer to Grosh, 1994. 
If the land market inefficiencies are also incorporated into the modified framework, we 
could have predicted the contract arrangements more accurately. The matrix presented in table 
1 can then be expanded to include combinations of quasi vertical integration with other contract 
arrangements. Table 5 presents an extension of the modified framework that adequately explain 
the observed contract arrangements presented in column 8 of table 4. 
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VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Several contract arrangements are observed in the production and marketing of fruits and 
vegetables in Ghana, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda. This paper explains those contract 
arrangements using a modified framework that incorporates access to finance and informatio11 
along with product characteristics that lead to asset specificity and uncertainty in production and 
marketing. A combination of low levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, access to fmancial 
services and information tend to be related with spot market mechanisms. On the other hand, high 
levels of asset specificity, uncertainties in production and marketing, and access to finance and 
information tend to lead to the use of completely vertically integrated arrangements. On the one 
hand, medium levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, access to finance and information combined 
with access to long-term land leases lead to quasi vertically integrated frrms that use other contract 
arrangements to buy from outgrowers. On the other hand, the same circumstances combined with 
restricted access to land for commercial production lead to some contract farming arrangements. 
Our modified framework provides a plausible explanation for the observed contract arrangements, 
but its predictive power can be increased by incorporating land market inefficiencies. 
Nevertheless, the modified framework broadens our understanding of the observed contract 
arrangements, and points to several implications for donors and governments. 
The inefficiencies of financial markets play a role along with product characteristics and 
land markets in shaping the contract arrangements found in the study countries. The risky nature 
of the subsector prohibits the active involvement of banks in financing the subsector without 
charging high interest rates. But major improvements in fmancial services for the subsector 
requires efficient mechanisms that reduce overall risks for horticultural production, marketing anj 
exports. There are examples of innovative arrangements that augment commercial bank lending 
to the subsector. For example, the ECO bank in Ghana provides post-shipment loans to pineapple 
exporters to finance transportation costs. At the same time, the Bank of Baroda in Uganda 
effectively uses large producers-exporters as conduits and guarantees for loans extended to their 
outgrowers. These strategies should be carefully studied for possible replication. 
It is important to streamline land tenancy arrangements. Long-term leases to producers, 
natives or foreigners, can be a viable option in order to increase the efficiency and equity in the 
sub sector through quasi vertically integrated firms that have links with outgrowers. 
Donors and governments can play a role in providing technical assistance and improving 
infrastructure facilities, and the collection and dissemination of market information. The example 
of Uganda can be cited here. Thanks to the creation of the Economic Policy and Development 
Unit (EP ADU) with the assistance from USAID, attention is paid to documenting and analyzing 
the prospects of the horticultural subsector to serve alternate markets including overseas markets. 
The unit effectively provides short term training in the production and marketing of horticultural 
produce, and market information. In addition, it engages in the match making of prospective 
producer-exporters with importers, venture capitalists and foreign investors interested in joint 
ventures. 
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The appropriate role for the governments in these four countries is to provide an enabling 
environment in which contracts can be made and enforced, and to facilitate effective coordination 
and competition among agents. In the end, however, the agents must develop and use contracts 
that meet their respective needs and interests. 
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Table 1. Factors Affecting Contract Arrangements: An Application of the Modified Framework. 
Contractual arrangements Asset Specificity Production Market Access to 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Financial Markets 
1. Complete vertical High High High High 
integration 
2. Quasi vertical High/Medium High/Medium High/Medium High 
integration 
3. Resource providing Medium Medium Medium Medium/High 
contract 
4. Production management Low/Medium Medium Medium Medium/Low 
contract 
5. Market specification Low Medium Medium Medium/Low 
contract 
6. Spot 1llarkets Low Low Low Low 
Access to 
Information 
High 
High 
Medium/High 
Medium/Low 
Medium/Low 
Low 
I 
I 
I-' 
w 
Table 2. Marketing Arrangements Found in the Fruit and Vegetable Subsectors in Ghana, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda 
Countries 
Ghana Swaziland The Gambia Uganda 
I. Crop Studied Pineapple Tomatoes/Cabbages Asian vegetables Asian vegetables 
II. Types of Exporters 
a. Producer-Exporter with/without Common Infrequent Common Common 
outgrowers 
b. Pure exporters with outgrowers Infrequent None Infrequent Infrequent 
ID. Marketing Arrangements Used for 
Exports 
a. Full vertical integration Common None Common Infrequent 
b. Quasi vertical integration Common None Common Infrequent 
c. Resource providing contracts to Infrequent Infrequent None Common 
outgrowers (inputs and technology) 
d. Production management contracts to Common Infrequent Infrequent Infrequent 
outgrowers (technology only) 
e. Market specification contracts to Common Common Infrequent Infrequent 
outgrowers (only market access) 
f. Spot markets None Common None '---~---!~fr~q~~l1t 
------- -
------~~-
---
Source: Interviews conducted by The Ohio State University Research Team, 1993/94. 
I 
f-J 
+:--
15 
Table 3. Sources of Finance for the Fruit and Vegetable Subsector: Summary of Results from Ghana, 
Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda. 
Type of finance Sources ranked by order of importance 
A. Producers ~elling to domestic markets 
a. Investment • Self finance 
• NGO grants 
b. Working capital • Self finance 
• Informal fmance 
B. Pure Produc~r~ selling to Ex:tJorters 
a. Investment • Self fmance 
• NGO grants 
b. Working capital • Self fmance 
• Informal fmance 
• Outgrower credit from exporters 
• NGO grants/loans 
c. Large Producer-Exporter 
a. Investment • Self fmance (retained earnings from other businesses) 
• Informal fmance 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
• Venture capital 
• Domestic commercial bank loans 
• Government loans and subsidies 
b. Working capital • Self fmance 
• Informal fmance 
• Overdrafts from domestic commercial banks 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
• Supplier's credit if buying from outgrowers 
D. Pure ExpQrt~rs lJul:ing from 
outgrQwer~Lindependent growers 
a. Investment • Self fmance 
• Informal fmance 
b. Working capital • Self finance 
• Informal finance 
• Overdrafts from domestic commercial banks 
• Supplier's credit from outgrowers and independent 
growers 
E. Eirst Qr near fir§t-time expQrt~r 
a. Transportation costs • Self-fmance/informal fmance 
• Deferred payments to airlines 
b. Marketing costs • Self-finance 
• Informal fmance 
F. Established exporter 
a. Transportation costs • Self-fmance 
• Imports 
• Deferred payments to airlines 
• Domestic commercial banks 
b. Marketing costs (packaging to fmal sales to • Self-fmance 
the importer 
• Informal loans 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
• Off-shore banks 
• Overdrafts from domestic commercial banks 
Table. 4. Predicted and Observed Contract Arrangements in the Fruit and Vegetable Subsector in Ghana, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda 
Country and crop Asset Production Market Access to Access to Expected contractual Observed contractual 
Specificity Uncertainty Uncertainty Financial Markets information arrangements arrangements 
1. Ghana: Pineapples Medium Medium Medium Low-Medium Low-Medium Production and Complete and quasi 
market specification vertical integration; 
contracts Production and 
market specification 
contracts 
2. Ghana: Asian Medium Medium Medium High-Medium High-Medium Resource providing Quasi vertical 
vegetables contracts and quasi integration; 
vertical integration Production and 
market specification 
contracts 
3. Swaziland: Low Low Low Low Low Spot markets Spot markets; Market 
Tomatoes and specification 
cabbages contracts 
4. The Gambia: Asian Medium Medium Medium Medium-Low Medium-Low Production and Complete and quasi 
vegetables market specification vertical integration; 
contracts Production 
management and 
market specification 
contracts 
5. Uganda: Asia Medium Medium Medium Medium-Low Medium-Low Production and Quasi vertical 
vegetables market specification integration; Resource 
contracts providing contracts. 
Source: Interviews conducted by The Ohio State University Research Team, 1993/94. 
1--' 
Q'\ 
Table 5. Contract Arrangements: Predictions Using Extended Modified Subsector Framework 
Contractual arrangements Asset Specificity Production Market Access to Formal 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Financial Markets 
1. Complete vertical integration High High High High 
2. Quasi vertical integration High/Med High/Med High/Med High 
3. Resource providing contract Med Med Med Med/High 
4. Production management Low/Med Med Med Med/Low 
contract 
5. Market specification contract Low Med Med Med/Low 
6. Spot markets Low Low Low Low 
7. Quasi vertical integration Med Med Med Med/High 
with resource providing 
contract 
8. Quasi vertical integration Med/Low Med Med Med/High 
with production management 
contract 
9. Quasi vertical integration Med/Low Med/Low Med Med/High 
with market specification 
contract 
10. Quasi vertical integration Med/Low Med Med/Low Med/High 
with spot markets 
Access to Land 
Markets 
High 
Med 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low/Med 
Low/Med 
Med 
Med 
Med/High 
Access to 
Information 
High 
High 
Med/High 
Med!Low 
Med/Low 
Low 
Med/High 
Med/High 
Med/High 
Med/High 
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